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Abstract
The following review explores Intercultural Information Ethics (IIE)
in terms of comparative philosophy, supporting IIE as the most rele-
vant and significant development of the field of Information Ethics
(IE). The focus of the review is threefold. First, it will review the core
presumption of the field of IIE, that being the demand for an inter-
mission in the pursuit of a founding philosophy for IE in order to first
address the philosophical biases of IE by western philosophy. Second,
a history of the various philosophical streams of IIE will be outlined,
including its literature and pioneering contributors. Lastly, a new
synthesis of comparative philosophies in IIE will be offered, looking
towards a future evolution of the field. Examining the interchange
between contemporary information ethicists regarding the discipline
of IIE, the review first outlines the previously established presump-
tions of the field of IIE that posit the need for an IE as grounded in
western sensibilities. The author then addresses the implications of
the foregoing presumption from several non-western viewpoints, ar-
guing that IIE does in fact find roots in non-western philosophies as
established in the concluding synthesis of western and eastern philo-
sophical traditions.
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»The problem is not a technical one, but one of social
exclusion, manipulation, exploitation and annihilation
of human beings« (Capurro 2007: 8)1.
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I Introduction
Intercultural Information Ethics (IIE) is the most significant develop-
ment of the discipline of Information Ethics (IE). IIE is also arguably
an untapped resource for one of the most relevant contributions to
comparative philosophies facing an information society and an infor-
mation culture. The following review is multitiered. Its concluding
task looks to contribute to a foundation for a comparative philoso-
phies discourse around the subject of IE by exploring the significance
of an intercultural understanding of the place of Information and
Communication Technologies (ICTs). Towards that end, a review of
the literatures and philosophies of the field will be outlined, conceived
as such by information ethicists from around the globe, explicated
below in sections four through six. It will look at intercultural per-
spectives on ICTs from both the point of view of globalization and
localization, outlined in section three ›Philosophy and Information &
Communication Technologies.‹ Preceding and concluding the review
of the field, an account of ICT culture as originating from and being
presumed through western and otherwise developed cultures will be
critiqued, and it will be posited that IIE is equally pertinent to, and as
will be argued, rooted in, all cultures. The above argument will be
crafted and envisaged through a concluding synthesis of comparative
philosophies from Buddhist and western-influenced IIE traditions
that endeavors to bridge a notable chasm in the field of IIE, namely
the foundational divide between information ecology and hermeneu-
tics, as outlined towards the latter part of section three and section six.
II The Roots of Intercultural Information Ethics
IIE finds its origins in UNESCO, 1997, with the »First International
Congress on Ethical, Legal and Societal Aspects of Digital Informa-
tion« (Carbo 1997), organized by the Government of Monaco.2 The
congress hosted over two hundred participants from fifty-four coun-
tries who came together to discuss concerns of digital information
access and preservation, and consisted of a wide spectrum of interna-
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tional professional expertise from numerous fields, from law to librar-
ianship to IT to journalism. The gathering prompted an awareness of
the need for the establishment of an organized global initiative to
regularly address the current state of the digital society, where UN-
ESCO was encouraged to pursue the task through its INFOethics in-
itiative. Since that time, the UN has followed the commission
through the establishment of the World Summit on the Information
Society (WSIS), held consecutively in 2003 (Geneva) and 2005 (Tu-
nis), where an international and intercultural effort to address and
overcome the digital divide supports the goal of an Information So-
ciety for All.
On the academic end, IIE is traced back to the inception of the
Cultural Attitudes towards Technology and Communication confer-
ence, established in 1998 by Charles Ess and Fay Sudweeks, held bi-
ennially; and the establishment of the International Center for Infor-
mation Ethics (ICIE), an international academic community formed
in 1999 by Rafael Capurro around the exploration of the field of in-
formation ethics. While Cultural Attitudes towards Technology and
Communication (CATaC) explores »how diverse culture attitudes and
communication preferences shape the implementation and use of in-
formation and communication technologies« (CATaC 2014),3 ICIE is
a center for publication and discussion that focuses on connecting the
global information ethics movement around philosophical founda-
tions for the field (ICIE 2014).4 The founding goal of ICIE is the at-
tempt to bring together the disparate reaches of the field’s intercul-
tural infancy into a collaborative community (Froehlich 2004).5
The history of Intercultural Information Ethics (IIE) as a sepa-
rate discipline of its own, apart from even the wider scope of IE, and
the inter-discovery of fragmented pockets of localized explorations in
ICT based IE, is only about a decade old. The burgeoning discipline
represented by both academic and practical elements of IIE was, in
2007, united in partnership between UNESCO and the International
Center for Information Ethics, and in a series of conversations regard-
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ing the nature of an Information Ethics for and fromAfrica, the union
saw the establishment of a new field coalesce from merely an aca-
demic venture into a globally recognized new discipline. However,
the above association is only one of a number of initiatives that shape
the foundations of IIE. Along with UNESCO, ICIE and CATaC, IIE
finds its early and ongoing home in ETHICOMP, a conference estab-
lished by Simon Rogerson, Terry Bynum and the Centre for Comput-
ing and Social Responsibility (CCSR) in 1995, as well as the CEPE
Conference – Computer Ethics: Philosophical Enquiry (1997), and
lastly the Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics, established in
2003 under the support of the Uehiro Foundation on Ethics and Edu-
cation in Japan.
A growing intercultural awareness of the need for a foundational
and unified intercultural philosophy begs consideration. Any attempt
at developing an IE without first recognizing and then reconciling
westernized philosophical monopolies to the exclusion of, for exam-
ple, Buddhist philosophical world views proves futile. Pak-Hang
Wong, who has written extensively in the field of IIE, and whose
interest in Chinese philosophy and ethics gives him a valuable insight
into the non-western applications of IIE, contends that the existing
discussions and dialogues in IE are dominated by ethical contexts un-
ique to western cultures whose ethical structures are not necessarily
compatible with the numerous differing cultural frameworks around
the world. Wong states, for example, that in western ethics, »the ar-
guments for the protection of privacy are often based on the indivi-
dual’s autonomy; these arguments may sound peculiar for Confucian
cultures, which generally weigh the collective, common good over
and above the benefit of individuals« (Wong 2009: 1).6 The argument
will be made herein that such differences are not necessarily divisive.
Worth quoting at length in its entirety is Rafael Capurro’s con-
cise summary of the field of IIE:
We need an intercultural debate on information ethics in order to critically
discuss the limits and richness of human morality and moral thinking in
different societies, epochs and philosophic traditions as well as on their im-
pact on today’s social appropriation of information technology. This would
open different paths of theory and practice that would weaken the ambi-
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tions of information technology, no less than the pretensions of moral codes
and ethical thinking, and open at the same time different kinds of strategies
when dealing with the digital divide. This debate presupposes a patient and
respectful philosophic dialogue that should not take place under a consensus
compulsion of reaching universality also because universality remains, to
put it in Kantian terms, a »regulative idea« that cannot be reached by any
kind of moral codes. The role of ethics is to enlighten or weaken not only
local moralities but also the pretension of universal principles with regard
both to their unquestioned presuppositions and especially as far as they are
practically misused for local interests. This is not a plea for moral relativism
but an incentive to enlighten our minds and lives with regard to the open
space of thought and the groundless world we share, which allow us to re-
main in an endless process of intertwining society, nature and technology,
looking for flexible norms that regulate rather than block such a process.
(Capurro 2008: 172)7
III Philosophy and Information Communication Technologies
ICTs have the potential to both support and undermine efforts to-
wards developing an equitable global citizenship. In part, such a di-
chotomy arises from the decentered nature of what will be defined
further below as ›digital citizenship,‹ a type of cosmopolitan citizen-
ship that not only differs from, but is opposite to the traditional poli-
tical philosophy of cosmopolitan citizenship that looks to a single
world state. Citizens of a digital cosmopolitanism, referred to here as
the ›netizen,‹ rather than the citizen, understands their global iden-
tity in terms of both localization, and cosmopolitanism. In other
words, they are a netizen among ›information societies‹ (plural),
rather than a citizen in an information society (singular). They are
not held to terms of nationalism nor state, but instead to their loca-
lized place within a global digital community, and while they hold no
particular allegiance to state or nation, they all the same identify fully
with their cultural heritage. They are existentially grounded rather
than geographically or politically grounded, and thus the options for
identity offered them in ›cyberspace‹ surpass, what in their view, are
the ever-increasing, non-tangible, and unattainable identities offered
them through traditional terms of nationalism and global citizenship.
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They are both citizen and stranger at all times, especially in their own
›land.‹
However, while ICTs enable global dialogue, awareness, educa-
tion, and new forms of being-in-the-world, they also enable the
widespread abuse of privacy, autonomy, anonymity, and security (Ca-
purro 2013: 3).8 The greatest and most relevant example of such
abuse centers around issues of surveillance, now the complex contem-
porary concern of IE in general and IIE globally. Such concerns are
demonstrated best in the contemporary phenomena ofWikiLeaks and
the NSA surveillance revelations, the fallout of which is just begin-
ning to be addressed (Bielby 2014).9 While democracy ideally realized
should enable trust, the mere presence of ICTs, never mind the abuse
of them, potentially undermines the foundational cultural and psy-
chological stalwarts behind democracy itself where the dynamics of
the distribution of political power and the ›rule of the people‹ become
muddied in an ICT-saturated world of open access to mass informa-
tion, resulting in a distrust of power structures in general. Charles Ess
and others demonstrate the preceding claim in a discourse that de-
fends privacy as being foundational to democracy.
Ess writes, »privacy is important as a means to develop a sense of
self and personal autonomy first of all – along with the intimate re-
lationships, and other capacities and abilities important to this singu-
lar autonomy. Thereby, privacy funds the basic elements required for
participating in a democratic society – i. e., personal autonomy/free-
dom and then the capacity for dialogue, debate, etc.« (Ess 2006: 223).10
Deborah Johnson states in her Computer Ethics, »one of the critical
ways that an individual controls his life is by choosing with whom he
will have relationships and what kind of relationships these will
be […] Information mediates relationships. Thus when one cannot
control who has information about one, one loses considerable auton-
omy« (Johnson 1985: 65).11 While ICTs supposedly allow govern-
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ments to protect their citizens from ›terrorism‹ through high-tech
monitoring security surveillance systems (the term ›terrorism‹ often
a convenient demonization of dissidents and oppositions), the means
to doing so can become a vice at a moment’s notice where the mass
›monitoring‹ of individuals for national security purposes becomes a
gross erosion of anonymity, as outlined by Ess, Johnson, and the in-
formation philosopher Luciano Floridi. To lose control of our infor-
mation is to lose control of who we are, a premise first offered by
Johnson, and recently taken up by Floridi who also contends that
our being consists of our information. Robert Herritt sums up Flori-
di’s premise, »you are your information, which includes everything
from data about the relations between particles in your body to your
life stories« (Herritt 2014).12 Thus the relationship between anonym-
ity, autonomy and privacy, at least from an IE perspective, is as fol-
lows – our autonomy is synonymous with our information, and any
breach of privacy is both a breach of autonomy and anonymity when
that which we choose to conceal or to reveal is removed from our own
control (Capurro 2014).13 From both psychological and philosophical
perspectives, such an erosion undermines more than simple privacy, it
also undermines the prerequisite of autonomy at the core of our hu-
manness, and thus threatens the very dignity of our being« (Ess 2006:
223). Chikako Endo, a scholar who has written and taught at both
Oxford and Kwansei Gakuin Universities, addresses at length the re-
lationship between autonomy, government, and democracy. The cor-
relation is developed in a number of her published and unpublished
materials, first tackled in her doctoral dissertation for Oxford Univer-
sity, Autonomy and Citizenship: Implications for Citizenship Educa-
tion (Chicago: 2008a).14 In an unpublished paper presented at the
2008 Political Studies Association Conference, »The Idea of Autono-
my in Liberal Democratic Citizenship: Autonomy and Citizenship in
Plural Societies,« Endo informs us that we must be able to first gov-
ern our own selves freely without coercion in order to externally
reflect and thus participate in a democracy as an autonomous indivi-
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dual. As she qualifies, »we can come to reflect on our commitments
and potentially revise them through such encounters. Without this
capacity to evaluate and potentially revoke our second-order desires,
our beliefs according to which we direct our first-order desires could
simply become an expression of habit and complacent belief rather
than one of conscious self-government and self-direction.«15 It is only
as an autonomous being that one is capable of reflecting on otherness,
the prerequisite to any informed citizenship, and thus the prerequi-
site to democracy.
However, it is within the above presumed concerns that IIE is
brought to a halt, not in the absence of answers to the above noted
quandaries, but rather in the uncritical assumption that said issues are
in fact the globally agreed upon concerns of IE. Ethics, as a discipline,
is deeply entrenched in western history, tradition and culture, and the
uncritical application of day-to-day presuppositions about the nature
of reality, being, and ›right‹ and ›wrong,‹ appear so automatically and
are so subconsciously engrained. And thus, as abstracted by Johannes
Britz, while the field of IE as historically developed under a western
worldview can be exemplified in three main notions, those being the
freedom of speech, freedom of access to information and freedom of
the press (Britz 2013: 3),16 a direct overlay of such foundations at a
global level is a gross misrepresentation of the subtleties of other
cultural and historical worldviews and ethical systems.
The above recognition is one of the founding concerns of IIE.
While traditional ethical philosophies (whether we are referring to
the western tradition – ancient Greece onward, or an eastern tradition
– Confucianism, for example), are forced to self-reflect on their own
tradition when faced with another, they can only do so within the
parameters of their own tradition. The western tradition, for example,
has attempted to assess the nature of morality from its own localized
perspective. It has critiqued its biases in detail, establishing what is
referred to as descriptive ethics (asking the question – what it is that
people think is ›right‹). From descriptive ethics it has established what
is referred to as normative ethics, a critical exploration of morality
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(what people ought to do), but recognizing even therein the biased
nature of the task, thus delving into applied ethics (how does one
put a critical morality into practice?). Finally it has considered the
realm of meta-ethics (an exploration of the biases behind the termi-
nology itself – commonly typified as ›what does »right« even
mean?‹).17 However exhaustive, the entire process speaks yet to a
specific cultural horizon, namely ethics as per Greco-Roman, Chris-
tian, and otherwise western traditions.
Regarding the futility of uncritically applying the western ethi-
cal tradition to a global scale, Soraj Hongladarom and Johannes Britz
note in their introduction to Volume 13 of the International Review
of Information Ethics, Intercultural Information Ethics, that:
The main area of discussion and debate within intercultural information
ethics centers around the age-old philosophical problem of universalism
and particularism. The sets of ideas promoting Western style of individual-
ism are predicated upon the more foundational belief that these ideas are
universal in nature. It does not make much sense to promote autonomy and
liberty of individuals if these individuals are restricted only to a few groups
(such as the European whites), because that would totally defeat what these
ideas stand for. On the other hand, those arguing for the traditional hier-
archical society ideas presumably also believe that their ideas are universal.
(Hongladarom, and Britz 2009: 3)18
The World Summit on the Information Society envisions IE through
a truly global-centered approach that addresses what it sees as the
most critical elements of a fair and equitable globally informed com-
munity. Its eleven key principles, as listed in its Declaration of Prin-
ciples, explore: »the role of governments and all stakeholders in the
promotion of ICTs for development, information and communication
infrastructure; access to information and knowledge; capacity build-
ing; building confidence and security in the use of ICTs; enabling
environment; ICT applications; cultural diversity and identity; lin-
guistic diversity and local content; media; ethical dimensions; and ex-
plorations of international and regional cooperation (WSIS 2003,
2005)«.19
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However, as noble as the above agenda is, encompassing the vast
array of potential dynamics involved in the development of an equi-
table global citizenship, it is ultimately still theoretically biased. As
per the First Regional Conference for the Asia and Pacific Region on
the Ethical Dimensions of the Information Society (12–14 March
2008, Hanoi, Vietnam), Peter Malcouronne comments on the princi-
ples highlighted above, specifically regarding the Asia-Pacific region:
Ethnic diversity in the Asia Pacific region is unequalled. We have hundreds
of millions of Muslims, Christians, Hindus, Shinto, Sikh and Buddhists; we
live under feudal kings, socialist prophets and capitalist roaders. Our differ-
ences pose unique regional challenges to reaching a consensus on Informa-
tion Society Ethics. Would we be able to reach a consensus amongst our-
selves? And if we did so, the concerns of our region are likely to be very
different to those, say, of Europe. Indeed is a meaningful International Code
of Ethics possible, even desirable? (Malcouronne 2008: 2)20
Predictably so, the above concern was realized in full when in a press
release of the Civil Society forWSIS during the 2003 Geneva Summit
it was revealed that there was significant discord among governments
around even the first article of the common foundation of the Sum-
mit declaration regarding the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. As stated in the release regarding the struggle over human
rights:
Not even the basis of human life in dignity and equality, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, finds support as the basis for the Information
Society. Governments are not able to agree on a commitment to basic hu-
man right standards as the basis for the Information Society, most promi-
nent in this case being the freedom of expression. (Civil Society 2003)21
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The difficulty of an IIE surpasses even the disparity among govern-
ments representing their localized geographical regions. While gov-
ernments traditionally represent particular cultural traditions, a digi-
tally globalized society complicates those traditional structures. As
Hongladarom and Britz note, »when we really look deeper into the
matter, we find that there can be as much difference within these
geographical regions themselves as there is among the separate re-
gions« (Hongladarom, and Britz 2009: 2). These differences are reli-
gious, cultural, and philosophical, and they are as many as they are
varied. As Wong states in regards to Confucianism, »it is often for-
gotten that Confucianism is not simply fixed rules derived from the
canons; but, it is itself a school of thought that contains various sub-
traditions, e. g., Neo-Confucianism, New Confucianism, etc.; and, the
problem of complexity multiplies once we consider Chinese culture as
a whole, which is constituted by Confucian, Daoist and Zen, and each
has their own moral systems« (Wong 2009: 4). When the above is
also considered in terms of geographical multiculturalism and the
interplay of equally dispersed subcultures as expanding uniformly
around the globe, the vast complexity of the matter begins to mani-
fest.
The initial consideration of an IIE, much like any ›international‹
study, attempted to focus on various cultural differences from the
perspective of geographical locality. However, insight into the nature
of globalization, especially as precipitated by an ICT-saturated, global
culture, quickly revealed a lack of such convenient borders. It in fact
revealed the birth pangs of the dissolution of said borders with the
delivery of a new and hitherto unknown spectacle in governance,
namely that of digital Global Citizenship and the concept of the neti-
zen. This wider concept of a ›digital citizen‹ seeks to surmount an
arcane understanding of political citizenship. Here, traditional ideas
of cosmopolitanism are revisited through questions of digital identity
and online being-in-the-world, demanding a readdress of everything
from patriotism to ideas of the face-to-face. The very nature of glo-
balization entails a new clash of cultures not from a butting up of
previously separated nation states of cultural, religious and geogra-
phical origin, but rather a clash of these same cultures in terms of new
forms of localization and inter-geographical cosmopolitanism in the
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world, of multiculturalism, of subcultures within culture, all propa-
gated by ICTs.
In Teaching about (and with) Digital Global Citizenship C. F.
Risinger notes that, »While national identity is certainly not going
away, there is a growing support for a form of global citizenship, and
technology has become a major and even transforming force within
this movement« (Risinger 2014: 1).22 While the definition of global
citizenship may seem somewhat ambiguous to begin with, especially
in terms of how its existence could ever legally trump the rights and
duties of national citizenship, the digital manifestation of global citi-
zenship has prompted a reevaluation of what citizenship entails in the
digital age. Graham Longford proposes a radical digital global citizen-
ship philosophy. Longford believes that the very nature of cyberspace
is both self-governing and structured towards enabling global citizen-
ship in what he terms the politics of code (Longford 2005: 1).23 His
concept of digital global citizenship is reminiscent of a kind of Hei-
deggerian ontology, offering both cyberspace and digital citizenship
as present-at-hand, where the code of cyberspace is pre-existent in its
very design. As Longford states, a digital global citizenship must look
towards »the ways in which citizenship norms, rights, obligations and
practices are encoded in the design and structure of our increasingly
digital surroundings« (ibid.).
Because of the prevalence of ICTs and their tendency towards
bridging cultures (whether for good or bad), and their overarching
influence in both localized and globalized settings, the above supposi-
tion of a present-at-hand digital citizenship ought to be considered
carefully. If ICTs are the predominant catalyst to a contemporary
cultural zeitgeist, and if they presuppose a ready-at-hand digital citi-
zenship, then it could be argued that the predominance of a digital
global citizenship must inevitably trump, if not at least work in tan-
dem with, any previous form of national citizenship. Longford con-
cludes, »Genuine technological citizenship in the digital era entails a
critical awareness of how code constitutes the conditions of possibility
for different norms, models, and practices of on-line citizenship, along
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with the capacity to resist and reshape-to hack, if you will-the pre-
vailing terms and conditions of cybercitizenship if they no longer
serve our needs« (ibid.).
In Capurro’s work on communication theory (specifically his
monumental Messages and Messengers: Angeletics as an Approach
to the Phenomenology of Communication [2007]), the hermeneutical
dichotomy between message and communication (as established in
the western continental tradition of philosophy) is opened up to es-
tablishing cross-cultural and intercultural communication as couched
specifically in terms of ICTs.24 Hermeneutics, originally worked out
ontologically by Martin Heidegger and perhaps subsequently illumi-
nated by Hans-Georg Gadamer, and demonstrated through the fields
of cybernetics and communication theory by theorists Claude E.
Shannon, Warren Weaver, Norbert Wiener, and Marshal McLuhan,
in many ways represents the foundations of both IE and IIE. The new
field of angeletics looks to »what extent the internet creates a new
angeletic space, giving rise to new synergies of messages and messen-
gers beyond the hierarchical structure of mass media« (Capurro
2011: 1). Tadashi Takenouchi approaches the task through what he
terms hermeneutic information studies or hermeneutic informatics
(Takenouchi 2004: 2, 6),25 an approach that captures the study of in-
formation in terms of communication and dialogue, based on Heideg-
ger’s original re-envisioning of being-in-the-world. Thus through
Capurro and Takenouchi, one encounters the crossroads between
ICTs and the hermeneutical circle, a basic hermeneutical premise po-
siting that any understanding as a whole is established by reference to
the individual parts, but in turn, any understanding of each individual
part must be referenced back to the whole, and that this iterative
process becomes the ongoing dialogue that allows the truth of a mat-
ter to emerge. Angeletics, as a basic theoretical foundation to IIE,
posits the possibility of navigating the cyberspace of digital citizen-
ship as well as bridging intercultural differences in global political
bodies such as UNESCO and WSIS.
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IV Privacy and Intercultural Information Ethics
From discord in terms of freedom of expression to mutually incom-
patible concepts of privacy, a global philosophical foundation for IIE is
yet wanting. The complexity of a unified definition of the merits of
privacy alone from an IIE perspective is lacking. The foundations of
the very concept of privacy cannot be substantiated in commonplace
evaluations. What do, for instance, North American and African cul-
tures have in common regarding ideas of privacy? What about Afri-
can and Thai cultures? Ess underlines philosophical notions of privacy
in Japan where the Buddhist worldview encourages the rejection of
one’s connection to self through the practice of denying one’s self its
privacy, all toward the goal of purification from self (Ess 2006: 9).
Such acts encourage a disclosure of shame and secrecy, a necessary
act that frees the self. By such cultural terms, there is neither the
desire for nor the expectation of privacy. Alongside other historical
causes of cultural transformation due to intercultural exchange, the
gradual global-wide proliferation of ICTs is contributing to a slow
transformation of traditional values in Asian countries under western
influences, adding a complexity to an already exponential escalation
of the intercultural face-to-face (ibid.).
Toru Nishigaki weighs in on the nature of IE in Japan. Nishigaki
highlights that IE in Japan, to date, is concerned mainly with main-
taining the status quo of society, and stresses that there is no drive in
Japanese IE as there is in its western counterparts towards an ontol-
ogy of being-in-the-world (outlined below in section V), instead
looking simply towards how ICTs should be incorporated into already
established cultural norms and expectations. He differentiates how-
ever, this general application of IE in Japan from his own understand-
ing of the consequences of ICTs on Japanese society (Nishigaki 2006).
Nishigaki takes a critical look at the western ontological presupposi-
tions of a coherent self and contrasts it to the Japanese idea of no self,
juxtaposing the two perspectives towards the possibility of a ›middle
way.‹ Where many western ontologies consider the wellbeing of self
as primary, in contrast, Buddhist philosophy does not adhere to any
confirmation of a coherent self, looking instead to an ethics where, as
in China and Thailand, the relationship between the individual and
the community takes precedence (Nishigaki 2006: 2).26 Here, the in-
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dividual and the community are entities that exist in convention only;
a concept explained in part six below, where the only ethical exchange
that can exist does so according to affording the best solutions to a
mutual common good.
To obfuscate the matter, Andrew A. Adams, Kiyoshi Murata, and
Yohko Orito, contend that the idea of privacy has always existed in
Japan, but that the cultural fluctuations of technology and law have
distorted the traditional cultural Japanese norms of privacy. As stated:
In keeping with this recent trend to demonstrate that the Japanese do have
concerns about privacy, we claim that there is a strong sense of information
privacy in Japan which has long been a part of the culture […] it is our
contention that this legal development is not indicative of a new emergence
of privacy concerns within Japanese society, but a response to the failures of
social norms that previously guaranteed such privacy. These failures have
been brought about by economic and technological shifts. (Adams, Murata,
and Orito 2009: 328)27
Soraj Hongladarom explores the concept of privacy specific to infor-
mation ethics through the Buddhist thinkers Nagasena and Nagarju-
na whose writings represent Theravada and Mahayana Buddhism re-
spectively. Hongladarom complicates the debate by arguing against
the very western assumption of a private self and hence privacy as a
reflection of that self. The concept of privacy, according to Hongladar-
om, exists only conventionally, but not ontologically, an assertion
influenced by the above two schools of Buddhism. He points out that
since the self does not exist in an ultimate sense, then neither can the
rights belonging to the self exist (Hongladarom 2007: 112).28 Hongla-
darom understands the Buddhist conception of ›no self‹ as advanta-
geously offering pragmatic solutions to the IE privacy debate in that
an exploration of privacy can take place without its presumed attach-
ment to self, offering an idea of privacy, even from a Buddhist per-
spective, that accommodates convention, and thus ultimately allows
protections against the same abuses outlined in the western ethical
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perspective. While the above notion excludes self in the ontological
western sense of beingness, it recognizes the physical entity that con-
stitutes a self. As Hongladarom puts it, »According to Nagarjuna, the
self as an inherently existing entity does not exist, strictly speaking,
but as an empirical entity, it certainly does« (ibid.: 109). Privacy too
exists as a »right« for this empirical entity, but only in a conventional,
not ontological, sense. As far as an exploration of IIE goes, the critical
difference between western and Daoist, Confucius, and Buddhist no-
tions of self and the potential of privacy being accorded them resides
in the presumed beingness or lack of self apart from its value, where
the value of a being exists only in its reflection as an entity co-existing
and interacting among other living entities. While Nagarjuna would
recognize the entity that is a self as being a part of and interacting with
other entities, such a self is only of value in reflection to its presence
among other entities and its political value. Hongladarom clarifies:
Privacy is justified in Buddhism through its being a necessary element in the
realization of democratic ideals that require individuals to be respected and
accorded a certain number of rights that would allow them to function effec-
tively in the task assigned to citizens in a democratic polity, such as delibera-
tion and participation in public policy process. In such a scenario, violation of
individual privacy would mean that the violator gains an unfair power over
the individual; thus, the basic underlying principle of democracy would be
undermined, the principle that individuals are equal in power in need of some
space within which they can live, think, and communicate freely. (ibid.: 112)
V Pluralism in Intercultural Information Ethics
Charles Ess speaks to the above noted foundational tenets of IIE in
terms of ethical pluralism. The aforementioned arguments regarding
the ungrounded nature of global ethics lead to the conclusion that any
stand on the truth of ethical claims whatsoever becomes culturally
subjective, since it appears now that truth only exists in the eye of
the beholder. Ess notes, regarding truth and cultural differences:
A first response, in the face of these irreducible differences, is that of ethical
relativism. Such relativism, of course, pits itself especially against an ethical
dogmatism – the usually ethnocentric belief that universal ethical standards
indeed exist, that these are known to a particular person and/or ethnos, and
that these standards must indeed be acknowledged as universally legitimate,
i. e., as normative for all people in all times and all places. This dogmatism
simply condemns all different views, claims, approaches, norms, etc., as
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wrong because they disagree with the one set of putatively universal truths
and values. The resulting intolerance of all such different norms and claims
inspires precisely the relativist effort to establish and justify tolerance to-
wards a wide diversity of views, beliefs, practices, and cultures. The relati-
vist can do so, however, only at the cost of actively denying the possibility of
ethical standards and norms that may be compelling and legitimate for
more than the individual and/or specific ethnos. (Ess 2006: 1)
How then does one come to terms with intercultural ethical truth?
How does one maintain information societies rather than submitting
to an idea of an information society? How do cultures exist both lo-
cally and globally, globally in terms of the digital cosmopolitanism
outlined above? Ess argues that succumbing to relativism is as good
as abandoning any hope of arriving at an IIE. Instead he advocates for
a pluralism that looks to a multiethnic, global city where the avoid-
ance of compromises is critical, specifically, the move beyond mere
tolerance or token inclusion, the consequence of which is nothing
more than a state of ignorance. In his estimation, a non-engagement
with ›otherness‹ does nothing towards enhancing the knowledge of
one’s world, mutual or otherwise. Ess explores, instead of tolerance,
the move to a place of authentic sharing, a type of pluralism he de-
fines by a state of shared multiplicities. Ess notes that if mere toler-
ance of differing values inevitably leads to ›ghetto‹-like divisions
within a global city, resulting in a form of cultural alienation which
inevitably leads to conflict through force in the end despite such tol-
erance, then pluralism must look towards a value structure built
around not just agreements of difference, but also on a sharing of
differences that avoids the fragmentation that so often accompanies
›tolerance‹ (ibid.: 2). This is not to deny that some level of compro-
mise must inevitably take shape in the interaction, but that the com-
promise not be forced begrudgingly, and in fact be a type of mutually
edifying compromise. Thus, Ess looks towards models of connection
and ›complementarity‹ in what he deems an active engagement that
results in both sides connecting through self and identity but doing so
without the negation of irreducible differences. The goal is irreduci-
bility not irreconcilability. Ess states, »complementarity relationships
preserve and enhance the irreducible differences that define distinc-
tive individuals, cultures, and civilizations« (ibid.: 3).
Ess further develops his thought in terms of pluralism in IIE,
looking to the origins of western tradition and Greek philosophy it-
self in order to escape the numerous strains of western tradition that
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might otherwise cloud any shared origins between western and east-
ern philosophy. He engages Plato and Aristotle as forbearers of the
above pluralism whereby Plato’s cybernetes (the origin of Weiner’s
Cybernetics, and thus of IE) and Aristotle’s phronēsis (practical wis-
dom) offer more than just a methodology to IIE, but also a common
starting place for IIE through parallels to eastern, specifically Confu-
cian, thought. Ess quotes Joseph Chan as making the crucial point
regarding the similarity between what Plato and Aristotle understood
as practical wisdom and what the Confucians deemed rén, the Con-
fucian virtue of shared humanness that focuses on the connection
between two subjects of an action. As Chan summarizes rén, »If after
careful and conscientious deliberation, two persons equipped with rén
come up with two different or contradictory judgments and courses of
action, Confucians would tell us to respect both of the judgments«
(Chan 2003: 137).29 This deliberation is the very act of Greek phron-
ēsis, where rather than employing an uncritical tolerance, and thus
avoidance of differences that create a cultural ›peace,‹ an accountable
engagement is instead pursued and a pointed and deliberate encoun-
ter results in a mutual edification of Self and Other based on irredu-
cible differences, not irreconcilable differences.
Yet even here, the practical application of IIE is still in need of
work. In addressing the aim of IIE, Wong critiques Ess’ pluralism.
Regarding Ess’ conclusions he writes, »it is unclear exactly what
counts as maintaining cultural diversity and respecting different mor-
al systems […] and when the norms are considered to be shared«
(Wong 2009: 2). Wong sums up the IIE debate thus far, especially as
culminating in Ess’ pluralism, as offering two possibilities, one unat-
tainable, the other attainable only under certain conditions. He expli-
citly outlines the debate concerning establishing an IIE in terms of
either »shared norms, different interpretations« or »shared norms,
different justifications,« where cultural norms are established differ-
ing only in interpretation of said norms or justifications of such, re-
spectively (ibid.: 5). His critique is that any such shared point of ori-
gin of reference succumbs to metaethical moral relativism unless this
point of origin is first clearly identified and agreed upon. Doing this,
however, would require a detailed and successful outline that, as ex-
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emplified in the above noted case of WSIS’ failure to develop even a
foundation for universal human rights, remains thus far non-exis-
tent. Wong attempts to overcome the above deadlock by replacing
ethical normswith common cultural values, but admits that a detailed
explication of what those values should be is yet needed (ibid.: 7.).
VI Information Ecology and Intercultural Information Ethics
As global consciousness (or at least awareness) increases through the
exposure of previously closed ethical systems to intercultural other-
ness, an inevitable evolution of IIE will begin to look at cultural and
intercultural perspectives of the interface between not only ICTs and
human agency but between ICTs and other agents as well, including
artificial agents (robots, cyborgs), environment, and the ethical and
moral agency of non-human beings (like animals), and indeed such
perspectives have already found their roots in the IE and IIE tradition.
Where western interpretations of being have thus far limited moral
agency to human beings, perpetuated by western notions of dualism
and human superiority as ›divinely designated,‹ the interface with
eastern philosophies demands now an accountability of western
ethics to life removed from religious and metaphysical moralities
and notions of human superiority.
Leading IIE in environmentally inclusive moral agency are the
notions of Luciano Floridi’s infosphere and Terrell Ward Bynum’s
notion of ›Flourishing Ethics‹ (FE). Where Bynum advocates for two
modes of flourishing ethics based on the ethics of Aristotle, those two
modes being ›human-centered FE‹ and ›general FE,‹ Floridi looks to a
post-analytical flourishing of being through a metaphysics of inclu-
sive moral entities that make up the entirety of what he calls the info-
sphere, an interactive continuum of reality consisting of the positive
and negative outcomes of information entropy. While Bynum advo-
cates for understanding flourishing ethics in the traditional Aristote-
lian sense (human-centered FE) he also insists on differentiating that
traditional sense from a Flourishing Ethics that applies to »every phy-
sical entity in the universe, including humans,« otherwise labeled as
General FE (Bynum 2006: 158).30 Floridi understands his ethics in
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terms of information entropy where all things consist of and are
formed of information, assigning them moral agency and attributing
all entities, living or otherwise, a more-or-less equal standing as being
deserving of ethical consideration and capable of moral agency, and it
is the moral action of each entity that either detracts from or adds to
the entropy of the infosphere (Floridi 2002a, 2000b, 2007).31 Though
coming from western ethical traditions, both Floridi and Bynum’s
ecological ethics are possibly conducive to, for instance, certain Bud-
dhist or Hindu worldviews.
Philip Brey, however, takes issue with Floridi’s all encompassing
IIE, arguing that while grand in theory, Floridi’s IE, specifically his
concept of information object as morally entitled, cannot be grounded
or supported, at least in terms of information objects possessing a
metaphysical intrinsic value in of themselves. Instead, Brey allows a
possible reconciliation of Floridi’s value-based information entity by
replacing his value-based metaphysics with a respect-based alterna-
tive. Rather than each information entity being entitled to moral re-
spect because of an ontological entitlement, the support for which
Brey contends is missing in Floridi’s work, Floridi’s infosphere of ob-
jects can rather be afforded equal moral respect as being equally va-
lued by other information entities. As Brey contends, »inanimate
things in the world deserve moral respect, not because of intrinsic
value, but because of their (potential) extrinsic, instrumental or emo-
tional value for persons« (Brey 2008: 10).32
Perhaps it could be surmised that Brey’s reevaluation of Floridi’s
information entity actually brings Floridi closer to bridging eastern
and western IIE within common roots in that a respect-based info-
sphere reflects Hongladarom’s Buddhist idea of reality convention
rather than reality actualization, specifically his necessity of no self
and also the negation of concepts attached to the supposed self, in the
case of Hongladarom’s work, the attachment being the false pretense
of the concept of privacy as intrinsically existent. Here one can afford
Floridi a platform bridging his own western-based post-analytic me-
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taphysics to Hongladarom’s Buddhist-influenced foundation of non-
being. Perhaps it is in such dialectics that a possibility for a cohesive
IIE exists, bridging two traditions that, on one hand, recognize the
complexities of the pluralism debate, outlined above in Ess and
Wong’s critique and valuation of such, and on the other hand a hope
for mutual perceptions of information ecology between western and
eastern traditions as per Brey’s bridging of Floridi’s infosphere to the
pragmatic grounding of convention. It is also conceivable that
through the establishment of such a platform, IIE can then begin to
explore, through convention via information ecology, the possibility
of intercultural communication per hermeneutical horizons along a
common trajectory of the Heideggerian-based work of Capurro and
the traditional information ethicists of the hermeneutical tradition.
VII Conclusion
While traditional IE assumes a western founded philosophy and an
intrinsic positive value to ideas such as privacy, complimented by de-
mocratic and capitalist concerns of ownership and rights, and assumes
a fundamental and existential self, IIE is confronted by a global mor-
ass of supposedly unremitting differences between eastern and wes-
tern thought that threatens the very undoing of everything that IE
has thus far established under its western tutelage, including the va-
lue and nature of self! Fortunately, IIE finds roots in non-western
philosophies as well as western, as outlined above, allowing room for
the exploration of a common intercultural ground for IE. While the
larger scope of IE readily looks to wider implications of the address of
the en-masse arrival of ICTs, pause must first be afforded to working
out an IIE whereby the sudden sharing of a cultural-techno world
awaits a fair advocacy. Such questions are yet to be addressed, or are
currently being surveyed in the field and will formulate the evolving
directions of IIE within the wider playing field of comparative philo-
sophies. It may yet prove that IIE ultimately and eventually provides
the resolve that bridges the long-suffering chasm between the vary-
ing philosophical approaches to IE.
–Jared Bielby, University of Alberta, Canada
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